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United States Recognition of
Foreign Bankruptcies
As international trade increases and multinational corporations expand
activities into more and more countries, the impact the bankruptcy of one of
these institutions may have in other countries increases. As demonstrated
by the fallout from the oil crisis of the early 1970s, the decline can be swift
and devastating. Creditors may be faced with the prospect of concurrent
insolvency proceedings in a multitude of jurisdictions. The United States
has traditionally not treated foreign creditors favorably, especially when
conflicting claims of United States creditors were involved. However, the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and the trend of recent case law
reflects a more generous attitude toward their claims.
I. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction under
International Law
The initial inquiry in any bankruptcy proceeding is to determine whether
the court has jurisdiction over the debtor or the debtor's assets. Depending
upon the country involved, this determination may significantly affect the
manner in which those assets are distributed.
Under international law, bankruptcy jurisdiction may generally be estab-
lished at the debtor's domicile or the principal place of a debtor's business.'
These standards have been adopted by the United States. 2 In addition,
*Associate, Lillick McHose & Charles, Los Angeles, California.
1. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and Bankruptcy, § 2.04 [1] and [2] at
3-229(1980). The debtor's center of administration has been proposed as a proper jurisdictional
basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction in the European Economic Community's 1975 Draft of a
Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar Proceed-
ings. See Nadelmann, A Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the European
Common Market, the United States and Canada, 27 McGILL L.J. 541 (1982).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-700, § 109(a) (1978 and Supp. 1985)
(hereinafter the Bankruptcy Code or Code). The Code replaced the former Title 11 of the
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jurisdiction in the United States may be asserted on the basis of presence of
property within the territory. 3 As a general rule, when jurisdiction is
asserted solely on the basis of property located within that jurisdiction, the
proceeding is in rem, and any adjudication will be limited to the res, or the
property located in that country.4 This derives from the general rule under
international law that the acts of one state cannot affect property within the
jurisdiction of another state.5
A. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAW RULES
The United States has adopted conflicting attitudes toward extraterrito-
rial insolvencies, as evidenced by two international conflict of law rules.
Under international law, the "universality" theory and the "territoriality"
theory have developed to describe the different approaches countries may
take in the international bankruptcy context. 6 According to the universality
theory, one bankruptcy adjudication over all the debtor's assets is held in
the jurisdiction of the debtor's domicile to settle all claims against the
debtor's estate. The trustee marshalls the debtor's assets, wherever located,
to the jurisdiction of the debtor's domicile and all creditors must go to that
jurisdiction to present their claims. The adjudication is to be recognized and
enforced by every other jurisdiction.
The advantages to the universality approach are that it theoretically
results in equitable disposition of the estate since all assets and creditors are
United States Code (hereinafter the Act or former Act). See also, Dalhuisen, supra note 1,
§ 204 [2] at 3-216 to 3-219. The Code removed the requirement that the place of business be the
"principal" place of business.
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (Supp. 1985).
4. Under the Bankruptcy Code as enacted in 1978, bankruptcy courts purportedly asserted
exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor, "wherever located." Former 11 U.S.C.
§ 241(a) provided that, "[t]he bankruptcy court in which a case under Title 11 is commenced
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the
commencement of such case." When jurisdiction was to be established solely on the basis of
property located within the United States, this jurisdiction was not limited to the property of the
debtor located within the jurisdiction, but extended to all assets of the debtor, "wherever
located." This assertion of jurisdiction beyond the res attempted to convert in rem jurisdiction
into in personam jurisdiction. This assertion was criticized as being "jurisdictionally improper"
by Kurt Nadelmann, a well known scholar in the international bankruptcy field, in hearings
before the House subcommittee considering the proposed 1978 Bankruptcy Code. See, Bank-
ruptcy Act Revisions: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee of the Judiciary, 94th Congress, 2d Session,
1445 (1976) (Statement by Kurt H. Nadelmann). Although Professor Nadelmann's advice was
not heeded when the Code was initially adopted, The Bankruptcy Amendments And Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 has corrected this jurisdictionally improper assertion by deleting § 241 in
its entirety.
5. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 631, 639 (1980); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see infra text accompanying
note 23.
6. Honsberger, supra note 5, at 633-36.
VOL. 19, NO. 4
U.S. RECOGNITION FOREIGN BANKRUPTCIES 1155
before one tribunal, and greater efficiency results since multiple adjudica-
tions in various jurisdictions are avoided. The disadvantage is that creditors
may be inconvenienced by going to the debtor's domicile to assert their
claims, and they may be subject to procedures which differ from those of
their home countries. To be effective, all jurisdictions must adopt the
universality theory and enforce foreign proceedings. 7 In reality, most juris-
dictions tend to protect local creditors when faced with the extraterritorial
effect of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding over local assets. 8 The universal-
ity theory has not been generally adopted, but may be effective with respect
to some countries through bankruptcy treaties.
Under the territoriality theory, bankruptcy proceedings may concur-
rently take place in each jurisdiction where the debtor or its assets are
located, and no extraterritorial recognition is given to these proceedings by
any other jurisdiction. The advantage to this system is that local creditors
are not inconvenienced and may receive better treatment in their home
countries. The disadvantages are that the debtor's property located in other
countries is not part of the estate of the domestic jurisdiction and therefore
may be simultaneously disposed of by the debtor or transferred for the
benefit of preferred creditors. Creditors seeking these other assets must
attach them in the various countries where they are located. This can lead to
multiple, and possibly conflicting, bankruptcy proceedings and national
preferences. 9
B. UNITED STATES APPROACH
The United States has not formally adopted either the universality or
territoriality theory to the exclusion of the other, but has adopted principles
of both. The determination of which theory to apply in any given case largely
depends on the circumstances of each situation. Prior to the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code, a lengthy, although not thoroughly developed, case
law history reflected the de facto adoption of the territorial view by United
States courts, at least when they were called upon to recognize the effective-
ness of foreign proceedings over local assets.'o Courts did not automatically
give full recognition to foreign proceedings with proper jurisdictional foun-
dations, but generally allowed American creditors to satisfy their claims
against assets located in the United States before turning over any remaining
assets to the foreign trustee." Subsequent to the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy courts have been more
7. Id.
8. Bankruptcy Act Revisions, supra note 4, at 1445.
9. Honsberger, supra note 5, at 634-35.
10. Id.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14 to 38.
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inclined to recognize the effect of foreign proceedings over assets located in
the United States when they have perceived that such recognition will
enhance an orderly, efficient and single administration of a debtor's estate.
Although courts still examine whether the interests of U.S. creditors will be
protected and whether such recognition will violate public policy, the trend
has been toward greater recognition of factors underlying the universality
theory. 
12
Prior to the enactment of the Code, little case law or statutory authority
was available to guide courts faced with claims of foreign insolvency pro-
ceedings, although ample scholarly attention addressed those issues. 13 A
review of the evolution of case law prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978 underscores the Code's significance in the development of this
area of law, as well as the apparent change in U.S. policy toward greater
international cooperation through increased recognition of foreign proceed-
ings.
II. United States Recognition Prior to 1978
American courts have been faced with the issue of how much recognition
to grant to foreign insolvency proceedings almost from the time the country
was founded. Even though the problem is far from new, surprisingly few
courts have actually adjudicated the issue. Courts have been forced to rely
on very old cases, even in the most recent decisions, since so little guidance
has developed in this area.
A. EARLY TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Initially, American courts were hostile to foreign proceedings which
attempted to reach property located within the United States. This coolness
was reflected in the early U.S. Supreme Court decision of Harrison v.
Sterry. 14 The case involved the bankruptcy of a partnership which did
business in both the United States and Great Britain. Some of the assets
located in the United States had been transferred in a preferential transfer,
and some had been attached by both American and British creditors. The
Court held that the share of the partnership located in the United States,
approximately one-third, was to be adjudicated in accordance with Amer-
ican insolvency laws. The British attaching creditors were not entitled to
void the preferential transfer or assert any claims to the American assets
12. See infra text accompanying notes 90 to 108 and 112 to 129.
13. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revisions, supra note 4; Dalhuisen, supra note 1; Nadelmann,
supra note 1; Reisenfeld, The Status of Foreign Administrations of Insolvent Estates: A Com-
parative Survey, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 289 (1976).
14. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
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because the "bankruptcy law of a foreign country is incapable of operating a
legal transfer of property in the United States."' 15
This initial hostility was tempered somewhat by the development of the
rule that foreign insolvency proceedings would be recognized in the United
States as long as the rights of American creditors would not be prejudiced
and no public policy would be violated. An early illustration of this rule can
be found in the New York case of In re the Accounting of Waite.1 6 The
bankrupt, Pendle & Waite, was a firm which did business in both the United
States and England. Pendle was an English citizen and was domiciled there.
Waite was an American citizen who resided in New York. Pendle & Waite
received an assignment from a New York firm, Haynes & Sanger. Pendle &
Waite became insolvent and voluntarily petitioned the London Court of
Bankruptcy for an arrangement with its creditors. 17 The arrangement failed
and the firm was declared bankrupt and a trustee was appointed. Waite, in
the meantime, had sold the assets received under the assignment and
credited the proceeds to himself, without turning any over to either his
partner or the trustee. Waite petitioned the New York court to settle his
accounts under the assignment, and the trustee intervened to challenge the
amounts retained by Waite, arguing that they were subject to the English
bankruptcy and should be turned over to be included in that proceeding. All
claims of U.S. creditors against the firm had previously been satisfied out of
other assets.
The court held that the proceeds Waite received under the assignment
were to be turned over to the British trustee. It reasoned that even though
statutes of foreign countries were not automatically given effect in the U.S.,
comity allowed courts to recognize foreign bankruptcy trustees and enforce
their claims to assets located in the U.S., provided that such recognition and
enforcement could be accomplished "without injustice to our own citizens,
and without prejudice to the rights of creditors pursuing their remedies here
under our own statutes. "18 In addition, such recognition could not conflict
with public policy, and the foreign bankruptcy court must have had proper
jurisdiction over the debtors. The court found that the British proceeding
had proper jurisdiction over Waite since he had voluntarily submitted to its
jurisdiction, and that the trustee could reach the assets located in the United
States since British law transferred title of all the debtor's personal property,
wherever located, to the trustee. Since no American creditors would be
damaged, the assets were turned over to the trustee in accordance with
15. Id. at 302.
16. 99 N.Y. 433, 2 N.E. 440 (1885).
17. Waite voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the London court, which was recog-
nized as a proper basis for jurisdiction by both the English and New York courts. Id. at 439.
18. Id. at 448, 2 N.E. 440, 450.
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public policy to avoid assisting Waite in perpetrating a fraud against his
partner and creditors.
The initial hostility toward foreign proceedings was tempered even fur-
ther in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Canada Southern Railroad v.
Gebhard in 1883.'9 The Canadian Southern Railroad Co. was a Canadian
corporation which had been created by the Canadian government to build
and operate a railroad. Bonds had been issued to finance the enterprise, but
the company found itself unable to meet its obligations under the bonds. A
restructure of the debt was arranged by an arm of the Canadian government,
and consented to by a majority of the bondholders. The restructure called
for an exchange of outstanding bonds for new bonds, and a waiver of
overdue interest payments. Disgruntled U.S. bondholders, who had not
consented to the arrangement, sued the railroad company in the United
States to require it to honor the terms of the original bonds, and to refuse the
tender of the less attractive new bonds.
The Court dismissed the claims of the U.S. bondholders and held that the
terms of the Canadian arrangement were binding on them. The Court based
its decision on three grounds. First, the Court noted the quasi-governmental
character of the railroad since it was specifically created for a public pur-
pose, was subject to the exclusive legislative authority of the Canadian
Parliament, and the reorganization had been structured and implemented
by the government. These quasi-governmental actions commanded greater
respect than if they had been accomplished by the private sector. Second,
the Court indicated that the U.S. bondholders had impliedly consented to
be bound by Canadian law by voluntarily contracting with the Canadian
corporation .2) Third, the Court discussed the nature of reorganizations, and
adopted a universality approach:
Unless all parties in interest, wherever they reside, can be bound by the arrange-
ment which it is sought to have legalized, the scheme may fail. All home creditors
19. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
20. The Court stated that,
every person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of
the foreign government, affecting powers and obligations of the corporation with which he
voluntarily contracts, as the known and established policy of that government authorizes. To
all intents and purposes, he submits his contract with the corporation to such a policy of the
foreign government, and whatever is done by that government in furtherance of that policy,
which binds those in like situation with himself, who are subjects of the government, in
respect to the operation and effect of their contracts with the corporation, will necessarily
bind him. He is conclusively presumed to have contracted with a view to such laws of that
government, because the corporation must of necessity be controlled by them, and it has no
power to contract with a view to any other laws with which they are not in entire harmony. It
follows, therefore, that anything done at the legal home of the corporation, under the
authority of such laws, which discharges it from liability there, discharges it everywhere.
Id. at 537-38. This rationale has been criticized because it cuts both ways. See infra text
accompanying note 110.
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can be bound. What is needed is to bind those who are abroad. Under these
circumstances the true spirit of international comity requires that schemes of this
character, legalized at home, should be recognized in other countries. 21
B. COMITY EQUATED WITH THE PROTECTION
OF LOCAL CREDITORS
If Gebhard indicated a trend toward greater recognition of foreign pro-
ceedings, that trend was curbed with the renowned U.S. Supreme Court
case of Hilton v. Guyot in 1895.22 The defendants in Hilton were American
merchants who conducted business in France, and who were sued there for
overdue payment obligations. The Americans removed all their assets from
France before a judgment was rendered against them. Unable to enforce the
judgment in France, the French parties sued the Americans in the United
States to enforce their judgment.
Hilton is significant because it firmly established the rule that U.S. courts
are to look to the principle of comity to determine whether foreign proceed-
ings or judgments should be recognized or enforced in the United States.
The Court noted the rule of international law that "[n]o law has any effect,
of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its author-
ity is derived."' 23 The extent to which any country gives effect to the laws of
another country is based on the principle of comity. According to the Court,
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.
24
Under this rule of comity, courts are allowed, but not required, to recognize
foreign laws, judgments or proceedings, depending on the circumstances of
each case.25
In Hilton, the Court examined the American defendants' argument that
the Court should decline to enforce the foreign judgment since the differ-
ences in procedures between American and French law were so great that
basic principles of fairness would be violated if the French proceeding was
enforced. They pointed out that in the French proceeding no oath was
required of the witnesses, no cross-examination was allowed, and docu-
ments and other evidence which would have been inadmissible under Amer-
ican law were admitted. The Court rejected the claim that these differences
21. 109 U.S. at 539.
22. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
23. Id. at 163.
24. Id. at 164.
25. As a prerequisite it is assumed that each proceeding or judgment sought to be recognized
or enforced is jurisdictionally proper. Id. at 166.
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in and of themselves were sufficient to impeach the foreign judgment since it
was conceded that the proceeding had been conducted in accordance with
French law. 2 6 The Court did not specifically consider whether the claims of
U.S. citizens would be impaired if the French judgment was recognized
because it found an independent basis for denying recognition under the
principle of comity: the "want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the
effect to be given to the judgments of this and other foreign countries., 27
Although not specifically discussed in Hilton, several comity considera-
tions may be examined in balancing the interests between international duty
and the protection of local citizens. Factors which weigh in favor of granting
extraterritorial effect to foreign laws include increased international coop-
eration through reciprocal recognition, economic and efficient use of judi-
cial resources, and avoidance of multiple proceedings against the same
debtor. Factors which weigh against recognition of foreign proceedings
include the desire to protect local creditors, the inconvenience U.S. credi-
tors would suffer in being forced to assert their claims abroad, and differ-
ences in bankruptcy laws which may violate basic principles of fairness
according to U.S. standards. These factors, among others, must be weighed
in light of the facts of each case to determine whether foreign proceedings
should be recognized under the principles of comity.
After Hilton, courts generally adopted the rule initially set forth in
Gebhard, that comity would be balanced to recognize foreign proceedings
as long as local citizens' interests were not prejudiced and no public policy
would be violated. For instance, in Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit,28 the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the ability of a state to satisfy the claims of
local creditors before assets would be turned over to a foreign trustee, even
though the trustee had a prior attachment to those assets. In Disconto
Gesellschaft, a German citizen, Gerhard Terlinden, moved to Wisconsin
and deposited $6,420 in a Wisconsin bank. A month later he was found to be
a "fugitive from justice" and was extradited to Germany. Disconto Gesell-
schaft, a German banking corporation in Berlin, garnished the deposit in the
Wisconsin bank and commenced an action there to include the garnished
funds in a bankruptcy proceeding against Terlinden in Germany. Augustus
Umbreit, a resident of Wisconsin, intervened to have the deposit turned
over to him to satisfy a bill for services rendered to Terlinden while he was in
26. Id. at 204-205.
27. Id. at 210. The reciprocity requirement has been criticized as counterproductive to the
goal of obtaining increased recognition of U.S. judgments abroad, and appears to no longer be
persuasive in the United States. See, e.g., Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d
Cir. 1975); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services, 49 BANKR. 614. (RWS), Slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1985); Morales & Deutch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recogni-
tion of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573, n. 10 (1984).
28. 208 U.S. 570 (1908).
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Wisconsin. The conflict was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
which held that claims of the Wisconsin citizen were to be satisfied before
any funds could be transferred to foreign creditors.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, citing Hilton, and noting that whether
a state should allow property to be removed from its jurisdiction to satisfy
foreign claims was not a matter of absolute right for the foreign creditors,
even though their garnishments were made prior to those of local creditors,
but that such turnover could be granted as a matter of comity. According to
the "well-recognized rule between states and nations which permits a coun-
try to first protect the rights of its own citizens in local property before
permitting it to be taken out of the jurisdiction for administration in favor of
those residing beyond their borders," each state could determine as its own
public policy how much recognition it would grant to foreign proceedings.29
Wisconsin's decision to favor its local creditors was therefore affirmed.
This interpretation of comity was also persuasive in In re Stoddard and
Norsk Lloyd Insurance Company, Limited. 30 The debtor was a Norwegian
insurance company which had deposited funds with the New York Superin-
tendent of Insurance as security in order to establish its business in New
York. When the insurance company became insolvent, the superintendent
took possession of the funds and petitioned the court to determine how the
funds were to be allocated. Three types of claims to the funds were asserted:
first, claims under policies issued to U.S. residents by agencies of the
insurance company doing business in the United States, second, claims
under policies issued to U.S. residents by agencies operating outside the
United States, and third, claims under policies issued to nonresidents by
agencies operating outside the United States.
The court held that the receiver of the insurance company was entitled to
transfer the funds to Norway after the claims of the first class, i.e. claims by
U.S. residents under policies issued by agencies of the insurance company
doing business in the United States, had been fully paid. Claims asserted
under the second and third classes were not to be paid out of any remaining
funds; those funds were to be transferred to the Norwegian receiver. The
court found that claims under policies which had been issued by agencies
operating outside the United States were not intended to be covered by the
fund, since its creation was directly related to the establishment of agencies
operating within the United States. Nevertheless, even though the claims of
the local policyholders under the second class were not to be paid out of the
fund, the court protected their interests by holding that their claims could be
proven in ancillary proceedings in the United States to avoid the expense
and inconvenience of being forced to go to Norway to present their claims.
29. Id. at 582.
30. 242 N.Y. 148, 151 N.E. 159 (1926).
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This interpretation of comity was also looked to in Fincham v. Income
From Certain Trust Funds.3 1 The court held that a British trustee, who had
acquired title to assets of a United States trust under a British insolvency
proceeding, was entitled to transfer those assets to be included in the British
proceeding since no injustice to U.S. creditors would result.
Rules of comity were not dispositive in every claim made by a foreign
insolvency proceeding to assets located in the United States. For example, if
a U.S. court was presented with claims asserting jurisdiction over real
property located in the United States, the court did not apply the principles
of comity. It is a recognized principle of international law that one country
cannot affect rights to real property located in another jurisdiction. This rule
was applied in In re Delahanty's Estate,32 in which the Arizona Supreme
Court held that British trustees in bankruptcy with an assignment from the
bankrupt of his rights to real and personal property in Arizona was ineffec-
tive as a transfer of title to the real property. Similarly, if a foreign proceed-
ing violated basic principles of justice and fairness as applied by U.S. laws,
the foreign proceeding would not be recognized.33
C. CONTINUED PROTECTION OF LOCAL CREDITORS
DURING THE DECADE PRECEDING
THE ENACTMENT OF THE CODE
More recent cases prior to the enactment of the Code continued to apply
this interpretation of comity in deciding whether to recognize foreign pro-
ceedings. For instance, in Waxman v. Kealoa,34 the plaintiff was the trustee
in a Canadian bankruptcy proceeding against a Hawaiian corporation, and
the defendants, who were residents of Hawaii, were the incorporators and
shareholders of the corporation. The trustee instituted suit in Hawaii to
recover unpaid stock subscriptions the defendants owed to the corporation.
The court rejected the defendants' challenges to its jurisdiction and held
that, in accordance with the principles of comity, it would recognize the
claims under the foreign proceeding unless the claims of local creditors
would be impaired by such recognition. Since the defendants were unable to
show that any local creditors would be prejudiced by extending comity to the
Canadian proceeding, it was recognized and the defendants' motion to
dismiss was denied.
Similarly, in In re Colorado Corp., 35 the Tenth Circuit found that since no
31. 81 N.Y. Supp. 2d 356 (1948).
32. 11 Ariz. 366, 95 P. 109 (1908).
33. Deltec Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Compania Italo-Argentina de Electricidad, S.A., Supreme
Court, New York, Apr. 3,1974,171 N.Y.L.J. 18,summarizedin 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 741 (1974).
34. 296 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Hawaii 1969).
35. 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976).
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prejudice to local creditors could arise by allowing foreign creditors to
participate in voting for a trustee in a U.S. proceeding when that trustee
would subsequently be subject to U.S. law, those foreign creditors would be
allowed to participate.
In a recent case involving a Canadian trustee, the Second Circuit recog-
nized the close relationship between the United States and Canada as sister
common law jurisdictions as an additional factor to be weighed when
balancing comity considerations. In Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen36 a duly
appointed Canadian trustee sought to recover records from two New York
offices of the bankrupt Canadian corporation. The defendants, officers of
the bankrupt corporation, opposed the Canadian order requiring them to
turn over the records on the ground that the Canadian order had been
fraudulently obtained. The Second Circuit recited the rule of comity that
foreign proceedings are to be recognized unless they would prejudice the
rights of local creditors or violate public policy, and held that "[tlhese
exceptions to the rule of comity are construed especially narrowly when the
alien jurisdiction is, like Canada, a sister common law jurisdiction with
procedures akin to our own." 37 The court rejected the fraud claims on the
ground that they were mere allegations and had not been adequately
proven. Absent any convincing proof of fraud or prejudice to U.S. citizens,
the Canadian proceedings were recognized and enforced.
These cases and the rules they established were the guidelines for courts
faced with the extraterritorial assertion of foreign bankruptcy proceedings
in the early 1970s. Comity is still the guideline for non-bankruptcy courts
today.38 This slow and intermittent development of case law established a
general rule, but no unifying federal bankruptcy law addressed these issues.
Foreign bankruptcy trustees were forced to seek recognition in state or
federal courts and were faced with the prospect that each state could
establish its own rules under its particular interpretation of comity. This was
the status of the law when the Herstatt affair shook the international
banking and legal communities in 1974.
III. Herstatt: The Catalyst for Change
The Herstatt affair highlighted the underdeveloped status of United
States law respecting foreign insolvency proceedings. The inability to
address the issues presented by the Herstatt affair has been greatly remedied
by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. To understand the
significant impact the Herstatt affair and two similarly significant cases had
on the Code, the events should be reviewed.
36. 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. Id. at 629-630.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 112 to 129.
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Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A. (Herstatt), one of Germany's largest
commercial banks, was engaged in the speculative foreign exchange
market. 39 Although Herstatt did not do business in New York in that it did
not have an agency, branch or office there or anywhere else in the United
States, it did use Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (Chase) in New York as its
principal clearinghouse for foreign exchange transactions. Herstatt suffered
extensive losses on its exchange transactions, and on June 26, 1974, it was
closed by German banking authorities. Although the bank was closed at the
end of the banking day in Germany, the day had just begun in New York.
When Chase heard of Herstatt's closing, it decided to "freeze" its accounts,
i.e., it refused to honor approximately $620 million in payment orders for
exchange transactions, but continued to accept credits to the account.
Herstatt's creditors from around the world quickly became aware of the
account held by Chase, and raced to attach it. The account was assumed to
be large and, in fact, held more than $150 million. Within days attachments
exceeded $200 million.
In the meantime, a liquidator and receiver for Herstatt had been
appointed by the Cologne District Court under the German Arrangements
Law. The liquidator cabled a demand on Chase to return the funds to
Germany to be included in the German proceedings. To determine the
rights of the liquidator and the attaching creditors, including its own claim
for five million dollars, Chase filed an interpleader action in the federal
district court in Manhattan. The claimants all filed papers describing their
claims, with the noticeable exception of the German liquidator. On the
advice of counsel, the liquidator chose not to participate in the interpleader
action, probably fearing he would subject himself and the Herstatt estate to
the full jurisdiction of the District Courts and the possible res judicata effect
a New York determination may have had on the German proceeding.
On August 6, 1974, Citibank unexpectedly initiated an involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceeding against Herstatt in the Southern District of New York.
The proceeding was designed to wipe out the attachments of the Chase
account. The attaching creditors quickly challenged Citibank's ability to
initiate an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding on the ground that Herstatt
was a banking corporation, and that such institutions were expressly not
subject to the provisions of the former Act.40 Under the former Act, banks
were excluded from the definition of debtors on the ground that the in-
39. For a full description of the Herstatt affair, see generally Becker, International Insol-
vency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A.J. 1290 (1976). See also Nadelmann, Rehabilitating
International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught By Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1
(1977); Becker, Transnational Insolvency Transformed, 29 AM. J. CORP. L. 706 (1981).
40. An issue was also raised whether Herstatt was a corporation since it was organized as a
K.G.a.A. in Germany, which has characteristics of both corporations and partnerships. See
Becker, supra note 39, at 1293.
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solvency of these institutions was adequately governed by applicable state
and federal banking authorities.41 Citibank's challenge raised a crucial,
previously unlitigated issue: did the exclusion of banking corporations from
the jurisdiction of the former Act apply to foreign banks which were not
engaged in the banking business in the United States?
To resolve this issue, the court was only able to look to the specific
statutory language defining debtors and the underdeveloped comity doc-
trine for guidance. Uncertainty over the position the court would take on
this issue and the lengthy time period anticipated for final determination
essentially forced Herstatt's creditors to settle their claims. The need for
these creditors to create their own solution highlighted the inability of
American law to provide satisfactory guidance in this international context.
The motivation to settle had been further enhanced by a May, 1976
decision of another bankruptcy court in New York of similar issues. In In re
Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration,42 a London bank which had never done business in the United
States commenced a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding in the bankruptcy
court in New York to recover funds held by its New York correspondent
banks.4 3 These funds had been attached by United States creditors. The
court ruled it had subject matter jurisdiction by holding that the language
excluding banks from the scope of the former Act did not apply to foreign
banks.44
This holding was affirmed and expanded the following year in In re
Banque de Financement, S.A. (Finabank).45 The debtor, Finabank, was a
Swiss banking corporation which was rendered insolvent when one of its
customers defaulted on its obligations to Finabank under foreign exchange
contracts. Chase and the First National Bank of Boston (FNBB) were
41. See infra note 53.
42. 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. den. sub. nom. Bank of Commonwealth v. Israel-
British Bank (London) Ltd., 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
43. Foreign corporations which did not do business in the United States but which had assets
located there were entitled to commence voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under section 2(a) 1
of the former Act.
44. This decision was reversed by the district court and reversed again by the court of appeals
in the Second Circuit. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals looked to legislative history
excluding banking corporations from the former Act. It found that banking corporations had
been excepted from the scope of the Act because separate federal and state regulations
supervised the failure of these institutions. Congress respected these regulatory authorities in
exempting banking corporations from the Act. No such rationale could be applied to foreign
banks not doing business in the United States since they were not subject to federal or state
regulations. The court also noted that if the London bank was not subject to bankruptcy
jurisdiction, the attachments of a few creditors would be valid and have priority over other
creditors, both American and foreign. To prevent this inequitable result, the court ordered the
assets returned to the London receiver so they could be equitably distributed pursuant to the
London proceeding. 536 F.2d at 511-515.
45. 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Finabank's correspondent banks in New York. Like Herstatt, Finabank did
not do business in the United States. After a petition for reorganization was
filed by Finabank in Switzerland, Chase and FNBB attached a deposit by
Finabank with Continental Bank International. Only a few hours before the
four-month preference avoidance period under the former Act had expired,
Finabank voluntarily filed a petition for arrangement under Chapter 11 with
a New York bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy judge granted motions by
Chase and FNBB to dismiss the petition on two grounds: first, the judge
found that Finabank was a "banking corporation" and therefore excluded
from the scope of the former Act, and, second, the judge found that no
prospect of rehabilitation appeared since all efforts by Finabank to recover
funds from its defaulting customer had failed, and since Finabank could not
provide the court with a complete list of its creditors since such disclosure
was prohibited by Swiss banking secrecy laws. The trial court affirmed,
citing the 1908 case Disconto v. Gesellschaft,46 and held that the claims of
the U.S. creditors should be protected before permitting the funds to be
taken out of the country "for administration in favor of those residing
beyond its borders." 47
The court of appeals reversed, based on its interpretation of the former
Act. It reversed the finding that foreign banks were not subject to the former
Act, citing its decision in IBB which had been rendered during the appeal.
Instead of looking to the principles of comity, the court looked to section
2(a)(22) of the former Act. This section allowed bankruptcy courts to hold
ancillary proceedings to foreign proceedings to assist in the administration
of assets located within the court's jurisdiction.4 8 According to the court,
that section provided the jurisdictional authority to allow courts to foster
"one of the basic purposes of the Act, i.e., equal distribution among credi-
tors" in the international context .49 The court held that the lower courts had
abused their discretion in dismissing Finabank's petition since the petition
had been filed to avoid the preferential claims of Chase and FNBB. It
rejected assertions that comity required local creditors to be protected,
noting that this interpretation would have authorized preferential transfers
in contradiction with the purposes of the former Act. The court also re-
versed the findings that Finabank had no prospect of rehabilitation on other
grounds. The deposited funds were ordered transferred to Switzerland to be
administered along with Finabank's other assets.
Although IBB and Finabank resolved the issue of whether foreign banks
not doing business in the United States could be voluntary debtors under the
46. See supra text accompanying note 28.
47. 568 F.2d at 921.
48. Id. at 919, citing Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59
HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1046 (1946).
49. 568 F.2d at 918.
VOL. 19, NO. 4
U.S. RECOGNITION FOREIGN BANKRUPTCIES 1167
former Act, many issues regarding recognition of foreign insolvency pro-
ceedings were left unresolved. Finabank's refusal to apply the interpretation
of comity which had developed under common law threw into question what
authority and guidelines bankruptcy courts were to follow when presented
with these internationally sensitive issues. By enacting the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978, Congress provided significant direction for bankruptcy courts faced
with claims of foreign insolvency proceedings.
IV. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978:
Section 304 and Its Interpretation
By 1970, general dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the former Act
prompted Congress to create a Bankruptcy Review Commission to evaluate
the Act and recommend changes. 50 After two years and extensive public
hearings, the Commission submitted its findings together with a proposed
draft of a new Bankruptcy Code. The frustration of the Herstatt affair and
the lack of statutory direction in IBB and Finabank prompted extensive
expansion of sections of the Code dealing with foreign insolvency proceed-
ings and foreign representatives. It was hoped that the expansion of the
sections of the Code addressing foreign insolvency issues would encourage
other countries to adopt similar provisions and enhance the probability that
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings would receive greater recognition abroad.5 1
A. FOREIGN BANKS AS DEBTORS UNDER THE CODE
Although it had been decided in IBB and Finabank, Congress addressed
the issue of whether foreign banks could be debtors under the Code and
come within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Section 109 of the
Code, which defines who may be a debtor, provides that a foreign insurance
company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan associa-
tion, or credit union engaged in such business in the United States may not
qualify as a debtor and therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Code.5 2 These institutions are excluded since alternative provisions for their
50. Paskay, Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Foreign Debtors and Creditors,
12 STETSON L.R. 34, 81 (1983).
51. In a note in the 1973 draft of the Code prepared by the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, it was stated that "recognition accorded a foreign trustee ... should
enhance the likelihood that a trustee of an estate appointed or elected in this country will be
accorded respect when he sues to recover property located abroad." Bankruptcy Act Revi-
sions, supra note 4, at 1443 and 1448. Nadelmann criticized this rationale in his statements to
the Subcommittee on the ground that reciprocity had not presented problems for United States
trustees. Id. See also Honsberger, supra note 5, at 671.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(3)(1982) provides as follows: "A person may be a debtor under
Chapter 7 of this title only if such person is not . . . (3) a foreign insurance company, bank,
savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association,
homestead association, or credit union, engaged in business in the United States."
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liquidation exist under various federal and state regulations.53 Conversely, a
foreign insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings
and loan association, or credit union not engaged in such business in the
United States is subject to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. 54 Federal and
state regulatory laws do not apply to these entities, so the bankruptcy laws
are the only laws applicable to the administration of any assets located in the
United States. 55
In addition to addressing this issue, Congress distinguished the ability of
foreign banks to be voluntary or involuntary debtors under the Code.
Foreign banks which are engaged in the banking business in the United
States may commence voluntary proceedings under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
of the Code,5 6 but involuntary proceedings may only be commenced under
Chapter 7 and a foreign proceeding concerning such bank must be
pending.57 The Senate Judiciary Report indicates that this distinction was
made to prevent creditors from "essentially closing down" a foreign bank by
commencing an involuntary proceeding unless that- bank is afforded the
protections of a proceeding abroad. 58 It has also been suggested that since a
foreign bank is presumed to be large, its bankruptcy could potentially
endanger the financial stability of its home country. To prevent creditors
from exercising this kind of power, commencement of involuntary proceed-
ings have been conditioned upon the existence of a concurrent proceeding
against such bank in its home country.59
An inconsistency in the Code arises out of this distinction. Section 303(k)
specifically provides that these special rules for involuntary proceedings
apply to "foreign banks."' 60 Yet, section 109(b)(3) of the Code refers to
other banking type entities in addition to foreign banks in setting forth who
may be a debtor.6' The Code does not define the difference between a
foreign "bank" and a "savings bank," a "cooperative bank" or a "savings
and loan association." Perhaps in some countries there is no difference
between these entities. Should a U.S. court define the foreign entity accord-
53. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5817.
54. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(3) (by inference).
55. See S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 53.
56. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(3), (d).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 303(k)(1982) provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, an involuntary case may be commenced
against a foreign bank that is not engaged in such business in the United States only under
Chapter 7 of this title and only if a foreign proceeding concerning such bank is pending."
58. S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 53, at 5821. Although section 303(k) simply specifies that a
"foreign" proceeding against the bank must have been commenced, it should be presumed that
Congress intended for this foreign proceeding to take place in the jurisdiction of the bank's
incorporation or creation.
59. Honsberger, supra note 5, at 640.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 303(k) (1982).
61. See supra note 52.
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ing to its foreign definition or the nature of its status if it were a United States
entity? Even in the United States it is far from clear how to distinguish
between banks and other related entities, as evidenced by the recent discus-
sions and regulations relating to non-bank banks. 62 Future revisions of the
Code should either include the related bank entities of section 109(b)(3)
with the involuntary proceeding rules of section 303(k), or clearly define the
distinctions between foreign banks and these related entities.
B. FOREIGN TRUSTEE:
SPECIAL JURISDICTIONAL STATUS
As a response to the reluctance of the German liquidator in the Herstatt
affair to appear in the New York bankruptcy proceedings, 63 Congress
allayed the fears of foreign .trustees by setting forth guidelines to encourage
them to appear in the United States and seek relief of United States
bankruptcy courts. To qualify as a foreign representative, the petitioner
must be a "duly selected trustee, administrator, or other representative of
an estate in a foreign proceeding." 64 Foreign representatives may petition
for relief under sections 303, 304 or 305 of the Bankruptcy Code. They may
submit to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court for such limited purposes
without being exposed to the jurisdiction of any other United States court
for any other purpose. 65 The bankruptcy court may recognize this limited
jurisdiction, but condition any order for requested relief on compliance by
62. See, e.g., Nonbank Banks: Current Status and Opportunities, 102 BANKING L.J. 4
(Jan.-Feb. 1985).
63. See supra text accompanying note 39.
64. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (20). A foreign proceeding is broadly defined as one whether judicial
or administrative and whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the
debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business or principal assets were located "at the
commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by
composition, extension or discharge, or effecting a reorganization." 11 U.S.C. 101 (19).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 306 provides as follows:
An appearance in a bankruptcy court by a foreign representative in connection with a
petition or request under section 303, 304, or 305 of this title does not submit such foreign
representative to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States for any purpose, but the
bankruptcy court may condition any order under section 303, 304, or 305 of this title on
compliance by such foreign representative with the orders of such bankruptcy court.
According to the House and Senate report, the inclusion of this limited appearance in the Code
is necessary to allow the foreign representative to present his case and the case of the foreign
estate, without waiving the normal jurisdictional rules of the foreign country. That is,
creditors in this country will still have to seek redress against the foreign estate according to
the host country's jurisdictional rules. Any other result would permit local creditors to obtain
unfair advantage by filing an involuntary case, thus requiring the foreign representative to
appear, and then obtaining local jurisdiction over the representative in connection with his
appearance in this country. That kind of bankruptcy law would legalize an ambush technique
that has frequently been rejected by the common law in other contexts.
See supra note 53, at 5822.
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the foreign representative with various requirements of the bankruptcy
court.
6 6
C. RELIEF AVAILABLE To FOREIGN TRUSTEES
Five forms of relief are available to foreign representatives under the
Code. 67 First, the foreign representatives may commence an involuntary
proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 against a foreign debtor as an ancillary
case to a foreign proceeding. 68 Under the former Act, foreign representa-
tives could not commence proceedings in United States courts unless they
convinced local creditors to petition on their behalf. 69 By conducting an
ancillary proceeding in the United States, the foreign trustee can administer
assets located in the United States in a manner which is consistent with a
foreign proceeding.
Second, a foreign representative may seek to enjoin the commencement
or continuation of any actions against the debtor or its property, the enforce-
ment of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or
the commencement or continuation of any proceeding to create or enforce a
lien against the debtor or its property. 70 This section recognizes that if U.S.
proceedings unduly interfere with foreign proceedings, the U.S. proceed-
66. 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1982); In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A., 10 BANKR. 790 (S.D.
Fla. 1981).
67. For a discussion of various procedural aspects for relief see, Given & Vilaplana, Comity
Revisited: Multinational Bankruptcy Cases under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 325 (1983).
68. 11 U.S.C. 303(b)(4), 304(a)(1982). Section 303(b)(4) provides as follows: "An involun-
tary case is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under Chapter 7 or
11 of this title ... by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning
such person." Section 304(a) provides as follows: "A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is
commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign
representative."
69. 2 COLLIER BANKR., § 304.01 at 304-4 (L. King 15th ed. 1985); Honsberger, supra note 5,
at 644. However, as evidenced by the IBB and Finabank cases, under the former Act courts
could recognize foreign proceedings on the basis of comity. See supra text accompanying notes
42-49.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1)(1982). Section 304(b) provides as follows:
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest does not
timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may-
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property,
or any act or the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or
enforce a lien against the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property or such estate, or the proceeds of such property, to such
foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
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ings may be enjoined to encourage a single, consistent administration of the
estate.71
Third, a foreign representative may request the court to order the prop-
erty of the debtor or the proceeds of such property to be turned over to the
foreign representative to be included as part of a foreign proceeding. 72 This
turnover may be conditioned upon compliance with certain court orders
designed to protect the rights of local creditors before the property is
released from the court's jurisdiction.73
Fourth, a foreign representative can ask for "other appropriate relief" of
the bankruptcy court.7 4 This catchall provision allows the court flexibility in
determining the appropriate remedy under the circumstances. For example,
it has been used to allow a foreign representative to conduct discovery
proceedings in the United States to assist in a foreign proceeding. 75
Finally, under section 305 of the Code, a foreign representative may
request a court to abstain from any adjudication of issues relating to a debtor
or its property, and to suspend or dismiss all such proceedings. A court may
grant this relief either if such dismissal or suspension would be in the best
interests of the creditors and the debtor, or if a foreign proceeding is pending
and the factors of section 304(c), discussed below, are met.76 Section 305
allows a bankruptcy court to decline jurisdiction over an entire case 7 7 at any
71. See infra text accompanying note 127.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (b) (2) (1982).
73. In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, S.A., supra note 66, and text accompanying note 92.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (3) (1982).
75. Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd., 29 BANKR. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983). Section 304 (b) (3) has also
been used to appoint an independent U.S. trustee to protect creditors. See In re Lineas Areas de
Nicaragua, supra note 66.
76. 11 U.S.C. 305 (1982). Section 305 provides as follows:
(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend
all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if-
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal
or suspension; or
(2)(A) there is pending a foreign proceeding; and
(B) the factors specified in section 304(c) of this title warrant such dismissal or
suspension.
(b) A foreign representative may seek dismissal or suspension under subsection (a)(2) of this
section.
(c) An order under subsection (a) of this section dismissing a case or suspending all
proceedings in a case, or a decision not so to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
This relief may be appropriate, for example,
if an arrangement is being worked out by creditors and the debtor out of court, there is no
prejudice to the results of creditors in that arrangement, and an involuntary case has been
commenced by a fed recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis for future threats to extract full
payment. The less expensive out-of-court workout may better serve the interests in the case.
S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 53, at 5822.
77. Id. at 5821.
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time after notice and a hearing has been held. 78 This type of relief is
particularly significant because a court's decision to dismiss or suspend
under section 30579 is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 80
D. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN GRANTING
APPROPRIATE RELIEF: SECTION 304(c)
Bankruptcy courts are specifically directed to look to the factors set forth
in section 304(c) to determine if an injunction, turnover of assets or other
appropriate relief should be granted under 304(b).8 ' These factors are also
to be examined to determine if abstention under section 305(a)(2) should be
granted when a foreign proceeding is pending.82 Section 304(c) directs
bankruptcy courts to
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration
of such estate, consistent with:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims or interest in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and incon-
venience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such
estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the
order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.8 3
These factors demonstrate the concurrent adoption of both the "univer-
sality" and "territoriality" theories of bankruptcy jurisdiction 84 as guide-
lines for U.S. bankruptcy courts. The first, third and fourth factors reflect
the universalist approach since they would seem to encourage a single,
comprehensive disposition of a debtor's estate which would treat all credi-
tors equally and ignore preferential or fraudulent transfers which might
occur if proceedings were held in various jurisdictions. 85 The second and
78. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1982). Abstention was granted in Buffington v. First Service Corp.,
672 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1982). The bankruptcy judge decided to abstain from exercising the
court's jurisdiction since, after an adversary hearing, it did not appear that the debtor was a
proper candidate for the reorganization sought. Similarly, in In re Trackman, 33 BANKR. 780
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), section 305 was used to suspend a petition for relief requested under section
304 in order to encourage a consolidated interpleader action concurrently underway in a U.S.
district court.
79. (or a court's decision not to dismiss or suspend).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 305(c)(1982).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1982).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 305(c)(1982).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1982).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
85. The "order prescribed by this title" corresponds with the purpose behind the enactment
of the Code, which is to assure the fair and equitable administration of the debtor's estate. See,
e.g., Finabank, supra note 45, at 918; In re Culmer, 25 BANKR. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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fifth factors of section 304(c), on the other hand, are more consistent with
the territorial notions of bankruptcy jurisdiction. By protecting U.S. claim
holders and applying the principles of comity which had developed at
common law, U.S. bankruptcy courts are authorized to refuse recognition
of foreign proceedings attempting to reach assets located in the United
States.
It is not determinative, however, that since three of the factors set forth in
section 304(c) reflect the universality approach and only two reflect territo-
rial principles that Congress intended the universality approach to outweigh
territorial concerns in every situation. According to the House and Senate
report accompanying the enactment of the Code, the factors set forth in
section 304(c) are to serve as
[g]uidelines . . . designed to give the court maximum flexibility in handling
ancillary cases. Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments
and laws of other nations suggest that the court be permitted to make the
appropriate orders under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being
provided with inflexible rules.
86
In addition to the factors set forth in section 304(c), it has been suggested
that courts look to other factors as well. For instance, factors which weigh in
favor of granting the petition of a foreign representative are:
(1) where the failure to grant an order in an ancillary proceeding will require a
local bankruptcy to protect local assets, necessitating concurrent bankruptcies and
higher administrative costs;
(2) where the foreign bankruptcy law is similar to that of the United States;
(3) where the relative ease of access to the foreign country and relative ease of
communication with the foreign creditors facilitates a convenient proceeding (on
these grounds alone it would seem that all things being equal, a court's discretion is
more likely to be exercised in favor of a trustee from neighboring Canada than one
from Japan); [and]
(4) where more creditors and a greater part of the estate of the debtor are located
in the foreign country.87
It has also been suggested that a court may look to the principles of res
judicata to avoid relitigation of an issue which was raised and adequately
defended by a party in a foreign proceeding. 88 Courts have also looked
beyond the specific factors of section 304(c) to determine what type of relief
is appropriate under the circumstances.
89
Unlike the status of U.S. law at the time of the Herstatt affair, the
enactment of the Code has provided significant guidance to both U.S.
bankruptcy courts and foreign representatives in setting forth who may
petition for relief, the kinds of relief which may be sought and factors to be
weighed in determining what type of relief to be granted. Removing these
86. S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 53, at 5821.
87. Honsberger, supra note 5, at 656.
88. Collier Bankr., supra note 69, § 304.03 at 340-19.
89. See, e.g., In re Culmer, infra text accompanying notes 95 to 110.
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uncertainties has provided comfort and a sense of stability in international
insolvency situations.
E. INITIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CODE:
CONTINUED PROTECTION OF LOCAL CREDITORS
Since its enactment in 1978, very few bankruptcy courts have been faced
with petitions by foreign representatives seeking relief under section 304 or
305. Section 304 has been used, for example, to establish an ancillary
proceeding in the United States to assist a South African bankruptcy pro-
ceeding to determine the rights of parties to real property located in the
United States. 90 It was recognized that this proceeding was in rem in nature,
only affecting the rights to the real property. 9'
Initially, courts faced with conflicting claims of U.S. creditors and foreign
representatives to assets located in the United States essentially reached the
same result of protecting the interests of U.S. creditors as had developed
under the principles of comity at common law. In In re Lineas Areas de
Nicaragua, S.A.,92 the first significant case addressing what type of relief
should be granted under section 304, the foreign administrator of a bankrupt
Nicaraguan airline petitioned the bankruptcy court to enjoin all proceedings
and liens against the debtor and to turn over all its assets to be included in the
Nicaraguan bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court recognized the
status of the foreign representative and agreed to issue the injunction and
turn over the assets, subject to the condition that all claims of U.S. creditors
be satisfied first. United States creditors were allowed to bring their claims
to judgment and seek enforcement against the assets upon obtaining leave
from the court. Since the outstanding claims of U.S. creditors exceeded the
value of the assets located in the United States, 93 this recognition and the
turnover order were empty gestures of deference to the foreign proceeding.
Similarly, in In Re Egeria Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 94 the
bankruptcy court in dicta indicated that the U.S. creditor claims under prior
maritime attachments to a vessel located in the U.S. should be adequately
protected before the ship would be released.
F. FURTHER INTERPRETATION OF THE CODE:
THE MOVE TOWARD GREATER RECOGNITION
This policy of protecting U.S. creditors as the foremost consideration was
reversed in In re Culmer.95 As the only case which has carefully analyzed
90. In re Stuppel, 17 BANKR. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
91. Id. at 415.
92. 10 BANKR. 790 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
93. The total value of the debtor's assets in the United States was approximately $203,000,
and claims against the debtor and such assets exceeded $4,000,000. In re Lineas Areas de
Nicaragua, S.A., 13 BANKR. 779, 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
94. 20 BANKR. 625 (E.D. Va. 1982).
95. 25 BANKR. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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section 304 in reaching its decision, In re Culmer deserves a closer look.
The debtor, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Limited (BAOL) was a Baha-
mian banking corporation which had been closed down by Bahamian bank-
ing authorities. The shareholders voluntarily agreed that BAOL would be
wound up, and commenced a voluntary proceeding in the Bahamas for that
purpose. Liquidators were appointed and the liquidation proceedings were
underway in the Bahamas when the liquidators filed a petition in the
Southern District of New York under section 304 seeking both to enjoin all
proceedings and liens against BAOL and its assets in the United States, and
to turn over all its U.S. deposits and assets to be included in the Bahamian
liquidation proceeding.
Several banks and financial institutions located in New York attached or
set-off various assets of BAOL prior to the commencement of the section
304 petition. These creditors opposed the relief sought by the Bahamian
liquidators, and one moved to dismiss the section 304 petition on the ground
that BAOL was a bank doing business in the United States and was there-
fore ineligible as a debtor under section 109 of the Code. At the time the
liquidation proceedings were commenced, BAOL did not directly operate a
branch or similar office in New York, but did maintain various brokerage,
clearing and custodial accounts with banks and other financial institutions
located there. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that BAOL was not
engaged in the banking business in the United States and therefore could
qualify as a debtor under the Code. 9 6 The issue which had posed an insur-
mountable obstacle in the Herstatt affair was quickly resolved simply by
looking to the provisions of the Code.
The creditors further opposed the section 304 petition by looking to the
factors of section 304(c) in making their arguments. They asserted that they
should not be required to submit their claims to the Bahamian liquidation
since Bahamian liquidation law so differed from U.S. bankruptcy law as to
be inherently prejudicial and inconvenient to the U.S. creditors. The court
specifically reviewed Bahamian liquidation laws and procedures and found
them to be in substantial conformity with U.S. bankruptcy laws and proce-
dures. For example, the court found that the liquidation was supervised by a
Bahamian court, preferential claims and fraudulent transfers were not
recognized, all transfers and attachments subsequent to the commencement
of the liquidation were deemed void, and no preference was given to the
claims of Bahamian citizens. In view of all these safeguards, the U.S.
creditors could not demonstrate anything inherently prejudicial to their
interests. The court noted that the Bahamian proceedings were not even
necessarily inconvenient, since creditors were allowed to prove their claims
by mail.9 7
96. Id. at 624.
97. Id. at 628-30.
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The creditors also argued that the Bahamian proceedings were tainted by
fraud, since the liquidators allegedly remained loyal to the parent corpora-
tion of BAOL in Italy, which had purported ties to the Vatican. This loyalty
allegedly biased the liquidators in their duties. However, since the creditors
were unable to substantiate these assertions, they were not granted any
credence by the court.
When the court looked to the comity consideration as set forth in section
304(c), it applied a more narrow interpretation of comity which had been
adopted by New York courts. This construction provides that foreign pro-
ceedings will be recognized unless the judicial enforcement of these claims
would approve a transaction which is "inherently vicious, wicked, or im-
moral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense." 98 Applying this rule, the
court found that since Bahamian liquidation law was substantially similar to
U.S. law and no convincing evidence of anything shocking or immoral had
been presented, the foreign proceedings should be recognized under princi-
ples of comity.
In examining the factors of section 304(c) in making its determination, the
court looked back to the legislative history indicating that the factors are to
serve as "guidelines" to give a court "maximum flexibility" and are not to be
viewed as "inflexible rules." 99 Adopting this flexible approach, the court
looked beyond the factors expressly set forth in section 304(c) in forming its
opinion.
The court looked to the purpose behind the Code in making its central
examination of what kind of relief to grant under section 304. The court
cited IBB in finding that the basic purpose of the Code "is equality of
distribution of assets among creditors, . . . and correlatively avoidance of
preference to some. . . .The road to equity is not a race course for the
swiftest."" 0o Looking to the facts before it, the court found it significant that
the section 304 petition was controverted only by those creditors with
attachments or which had exercised set-offs, and that the two major credi-
tors, which did not have any such attachments or set-offs, did not oppose the
transfer of assets to the Bahamian liquidation. The court stated that, "[t]o
allow these opposing creditors to preclude the relief requested would grant
them preferences to which they are not entitled either in a Bahamian
liquidation .... This court is thus not obliged to protect the positions of
fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy
favoring uniform administration in a foreign court."' 0' 1 This finding is sig-
nificant because it specifically rejects the rule which had developed at
98. Id. at 629.
99. The court cited the House and Senate report quoted in text accompanying supra note 86.
100. 25 BANKR. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), citing IBB, 536 F.2d at 513.
101. Id., at 629.
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common law to satisfy the claims of U.S. creditors, even if preferential,
before assets would be turned over to a foreign trustee. Instead, the court
found that when the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Code requiring
equality of distribution and avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers
directly conflicts with the claims of U.S. creditors, that the interests of U.S.
creditors will be compromised in favor of equitable distribution.
In addition to looking to the purpose behind the Code, the court looked to
other factors not listed in section 304(c). The preface to 304(c) directs courts
to look to the specific factors listed to "best assure an economical and
expeditious administration of [the] estate. ' ' 10 2 Since BAOL's records and
employees were in the Bahamas and the liquidators and their staffs were
located there and were bound by Bahamian law and rulings of the Bahamian
court supervising the liquidation, the court found that the "Bahamian court
can most efficiently deal with all of BAOL's creditors, both American and
worldwide."' 0 3 The court supported the theory that the most efficient and
economical disposition of an estate should take place in a single place.10 4
Absent a showing of unfairness to U.S. creditors in the foreign proceeding,
it found that this efficiency should be encouraged.
The court also found it significant that the Bahamas was a "sister common
law" jurisdiction.' 05 Looking back to Gebhard10 6 and Cornfeld,10 7 the court
reviewed the special deference which had traditionally been given to Cana-
dian proceedings. Since the English Companies Act formed the basis for
both Canadian and Bahamian liquidation law, the court held that Bahamian
proceedings should also receive special deference.
In addition, the court cited the rationale set forth in Gebhard in finding
that the U.S. creditors had impliedly consented to the application of Baha-
mian law since they had voluntarily dealt with a Bahamian corporation.°8
This rationale has been criticized because it cuts both ways: a foreign
corporation which voluntarily deals with U.S. businesses should equally
expect to be governed by U.S. law.' 0 9
Citing all of these considerations, the court granted the section 304
petition filed by the Bahamian liquidators. It enjoined the creation, perfec-
tion or enforcement of any lien, set-off, attachment or judgment of any
assets of BAOL located in the district without the prior order of the
102. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1982).
103. 25 BANKR. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
104. Id., at 633.
105. Id., at 631.
106. 109 U.S. 527 (1883); see supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
107. Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd
without opinion 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979); see infra text accompanying notes 114-117.
108. 25 BANKR. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), citing 109 U.S. at 537-38. Culmer quoted the language
from Gebhard set forth in supra note 20.
109. Morales & Deutsch, supra note 27, at 1593.
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Bahamian court, enjoined all proceedings against BAOL or its assets and
ordered the assets to be turned over to the liquidators to be administered by
the Bahamian court.' 10
V. The Trend toward Greater Recognition:
Post Code Non-Bankruptcy Cases
The enactment of the foreign insolvency provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code did not have any direct impact on non-bankruptcy courts, since only
bankruptcy courts and courts reviewing bankruptcy decisions are bound by
the Code. All other courts must still look to the principle of comity estab-
lished by common law to determine whether a foreign insolvency proceed-
ing should be recognized. After the enactment of the Code in 1978,
non-bankruptcy courts applying rules of comity became more lenient in
recognizing the effectiveness of foreign insolvency proceedings when such
proceedings conflicted with the interests of U.S. citizens. This trend began
with the cases immediately preceding the Herstatt affair, e.g., Clarkson,"1
IBB 112 and Finabank,'13 and has continued in a steady pattern.
A. DEFERENCE TOWARD COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS,
FRAUD BY U.S. CREDITORS
Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd.,14 which has been fre-
quently cited by both courts and commentators, illustrates the continued
special recognition given by U.S. courts to proceedings held in sister com-
mon law jurisdictions. 1 5 The debtor, Investors Overseas Services, Ltd.
(lOS), was a Canadian corporation being liquidated in Canada. Cornfeld, a
former officer and director of lOS, sued IOS under an indemnity agreement
in the Southern District of New York and sought to attach over one million
dollars of lOS funds located in New York. The Canadian liquidator moved
to dismiss on the ground that the court should defer to the Canadian
liquidation proceeding. Cornfeld opposed the motion on the ground that his
interests as a U.S. resident would be impaired if he were unable to recover in
New York.
The court dismissed the case on the principles of comity in deference to
Canada as a sister common law jurisdiction, and since such dismissal did not
violate the public policy of New York or the United States. Not only would
this recognition not violate public policy, the court found that recognition
110. 25 BANKR. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
111. See supra text accompanying note 36.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 42 to 44.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 45 to 49.
114. 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
115. See also Fleeger v. Clarkson Co., 86 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(Canada).
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would further public policy, "for the firm policy of American courts is the
staying of actions against a corporation which is the subject of a bankruptcy
proceeding in another jurisdiction."116 The court cited Gebhard in stressing
that a liquidation of the size and scope of lOS, which had assets and creditors
all over the world, could only be effective if each country cooperated with a
single proceeding located at the jurisdiction of the debtor's incorporation.
Both the Canadian and American bankruptcy codes contain provisions
which were "intended to ensure that the assets of a bankrupt are efficiently
and fairly distributed among its creditors in a single proceeding instead of
erratically being disposed of in a number of different lawsuits." 1 7 The court
struck down Cornfeld's attempt to attach U.S. funds to defraud the Cana-
dian liquidation and ordered him to go to Canada to assert his claims.
A more blatant attempt by a U.S. citizen to defraud a foreign insolvency
proceeding may be found in the recent case of Daniels v. Powell. l S As in
Cornfeld, a director of a Bahamian corporation sought to avoid foreign
liquidation proceedings. Powell, the director, convinced the Bahamian
receiver to turn over deeds to some of the corporate debtor's real property
located in the U.S. upon the representation that Powell was merely trying to
negotiate with some of the corporation's creditors to avoid the need for
liquidation. In fact, Powell sold the properties in violation of the Bahamian
proceeding and used the funds to repay select creditors of the corporation,
including Powell's father, as well as for personal benefit.
The court in Daniels had no problem finding that the liquidation proceed-
ings of the Bahamas, as a sister common law jurisdiction, should be recog-
nized under principles of comity. This finding allowed the court to recognize
the status of the receiver in order to grant her motion for summary judgmeiit
against Powell for conversion. "9 Both Cornfeld and Daniels reflect a strong
policy by courts not to tolerate fraudulent attempts by U.S. residents to
extricate themselves from their obligations under foreign insolvency pro-
ceedings.
B. NON-COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS:
THE TREND CONTINUES
In another well-known case, the district court in the Southern District of
New York, in Kenner Products Co. v. Societe Fonciere Et Financiere
Agache-Willot,120 suspended a lawsuit on a guaranty pending before it in
116. 471 F. Supp. at 1259.
117. Id. at 1260.
118. No. 84 C 1889, slip op. (E.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1985).
119. The court also invoked the rationale of Gebhard, supra note 20, in finding that Powell
had voluntarily invoked the laws of Bermuda by choosing to incorporate the debtor there.
120. 532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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deference to an insolvency proceeding which had been filed against the
defendant in France after the U.S. suit had been filed. The court noted that
it was to look to the principles of comity, and that under the narrowly
construed exceptions to the comity doctrine adopted in New York, New
York courts generally recognize "the statutory title of an alien trustee in
bankruptcy as long as the foreign court had jurisdiction over the bankrupt
and the foreign proceeding has not resulted in the violation of public
policy."' 121 Since U.S. bankruptcy law also provides for a suspension of
actions against a bankrupt to assist in the efficient and fair distribution of a
debtor's assets in a single proceeding, the court found that U.S. policy would
not be violated if the suit were suspended pending the outcome of the
French bankruptcy proceeding.
It is not insignificant that the courts in both Cornfeld and Agache-Willot
declined to enforce the choice of law or choice of venue clauses in reaching
their decisions. The underlying contracts giving rise to the disputes to be
resolved in the U.S. courts contained clauses indicating New York law was
to govern and that actions with respect to such contracts were to be brought
in New York. In Cornfeld, the court held that the existence of such clause
was "not conclusive." 22 In Agache-Willot, the court found that such clause
did not "override" the "concerns for comity and judicial efficiency." 2 3 Any
fostering of international cooperation and stability through increased recog-
nition of foreign insolvency proceedings may be defeated if U.S. courts
concurrently remove the ability of parties to predictably choose the law
which will apply to their contracts and the ability to decide where any
disputes should be heard.
C. ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC POLICY
AS AN ELEMENT OF COMITY
Several recent decisions have demonstrated the need to analyze U.S.
public policy to determine whether deference to foreign proceedings should
be made on the principles of comity. For instance, in Sabolyk v. Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 124 the court was forced to look to U.S.
letter of credit law to determine whether a foreign proceeding violated
public policy. The case addressed the issue of whether an attachment order
made by a Swiss court against letters of credit issued by the Zurich, Switzer-
land branch of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Morgan-
Zurich) and the penal prohibition against Morgan-Zurich from paying
under the letters of credit should be honored by a U.S. court based on
121. Id. at 479.
122. 471 F. Supp. at 1261.
123. 532 F. Supp. at 479.
124. No. 84 Civ. 3179 (MJL), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984).
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principles of comity. The Swiss court had ordered the attachment on the
basis of allegations of fraud in the underlying contract, which the court
noted is also recognized as a defense to payment of letters of credit under
U.S. and New York law. Finding that no public policy was violated and that
the Swiss court had jurisdiction, the court deferred to the Swiss court's
ruling on the principles of comity.
In a more recent and celebrated case, the Second Circuit reversed itself in
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 25 finding
that its initial interpretation of U.S. policy had been incorrect. The case was
brought by Allied Bank International as agent for a syndicate of thirty-nine
banks to enforce promissory notes made by three Costa Rican banks. The
government and Central Bank of Costa Rica had issued decrees suspending
payments on external debt in connection with the restructuring of all Costa
Rican debt. The Second Circuit court, in an April 1984 decision,1 26 ruled
that Costa Rica's action should be recognized in the United States as a
matter of comity. Citing Gebhard, it analogized Costa Rica's prohibition of
payments of its external debt to the reorganization provisions of the Code.
In addition, it determined that such suspension was consistent with the
United States government's policy of assisting the Costa Rican government
in its attempt to restructure its foreign debt since the President had specifi-
cally agreed to continue U.S. assistance to Costa Rica despite the suspen-
sion.
Upon rehearing, the United States Justice Department, in an amicus curie
brief, disputed the court's analysis of United States policy in the matter. It
argued that although the U.S. continued to assist Costa Rica and supported
the efforts of the International Monetary Fund to restructure the debt, the
underlying payment obligations remained valid and enforceable. By sus-
pending payments, Costa Rica had attempted to unilaterally restructure its
debt. This was inconsistent with the system of international cooperation and
negotiation and was therefore inconsistent with United States policy. Per-
suaded by the government's interpretation of U.S. policy in this matter, the
court nullified its prior holding.
D. THE CONTINUED TREND TOWARD
GREATER RECOGNITION
As long as no claims of U.S. creditors are involved, courts have remained
more than willing to defer to a foreign proceeding. In Cunard Steamship Co.
v. Salen Reefer Services, 127 the court was not faced with conflicting claims of
U.S. creditors, but with a struggle between a Swedish bankruptcy trustee
125. No. 225, slip op. (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1985).
126. 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984).
127. 49 BANKR. 614 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1985).
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and an English attaching creditor. Specifically, the court was presented with
the issue of whether it should recognize a Swedish bankruptcy proceeding of
a Swedish corporation which would invalidate a subsequent maritime
attachment by an English creditor. The court looked to the comity principles
set forth in Hilton and more recent comity decisions, as well as section 304 of
the Bankruptcy Code, in holding that U.S. policy would be furthered by
recognizing the Swedish proceeding to "facilitate the orderly and systematic
distribution of the assets of Salen and avoid the piecemeal litigation of the
estimated $650 million in liabilities of Salen and its affiliated companies. '1 28
The English attachment was vacated so the assets of Salen could be "dis-
tributed in a single proceeding in Sweden pursuant to Swedish law."'' 2 9
The trend toward greater recognition of foreign proceedings is aptly
illustrated by the most recent case in this area, Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group Inc. v. Galardi. 13 The debtor, Galardi, was a resident of Dubai,
United Arab Emigrants. Galardi traded commodities on U.S. exchanges
and maintained an account with Drexel in New York. Galardi was not
successful in his commodity trading, and accrued a deficit account with
Drexel exceeding nineteen million dollars. To assure repayment, Galardi
made a promissory note payable to Drexel, secured by stock in the Union
Bank of the Middle East Ltd. (UMBE). Galardi defaulted in payments on
the note, which specified that it was governed by New York law. Drexel sued
Galardi in the Southern District of New York for default in payments on the
note.
Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, a Dubai court appointed a receiver to
manage all Galardi's affairs and to administer an orderly liquidation of his
estate. The receiver feared UMBE would suffer serious losses if involved in
the Galardi liquidation, so to avert a national financial disaster the receiver
sold the UMBE stock and deposited the proceeds with the rest of the estate.
Galardi moved the district court to dismiss the suit against him on the note
on the basis of international comity, arguing that the court should defer to
the liquidation proceedings underway in Dubai. Drexel opposed dismissal,
arguing that the proceeding in Dubai had been commenced as a direct
response to its suit in a plan to fraudulently dispose of Drexel's security
interests in the stock to reduce its chances for repayment.
The court, citing Gebhard and Cornfeld, stated that comity creates a
presumption that American courts should defer to foreign proceedings
which are essentially fair. By holding an orderly liquidation proceeding to
administer all Galardi's assets, the court found the Dubai procedure to be
128. Id.
129. Id. The court rejected arguments requiring reciprocity, noting that it was irrelevant
whether Sweden would similarly recognize American proceedings.
130. 610 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1985).
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"facially" fair. The court was not persuaded by Drexel's argument that it
had been defrauded when its collateral had been sold, noting that "[inter-
national comity is not reserved for foreign proceedings that obtain results
identical to those under American law." 131 Absent any clear showing of
fraud, Drexel's assertions were not persuasive. The court dismissed the suit,
holding that the Dubai proceeding should be deferred to as a matter of
international comity.
Drexel is significant because it grants the relief sought by a foreign trustee
even though the foreign jurisdiction was not a sister common law jurisdic-
tion, the interests of the U.S. creditor were harmed as a result, and no
fraudulent or inequitable conduct by the U.S. creditor was involved. Drexel,
along with Agache-Willot, Finabank and Culmer, reflect a trend developing
in United States courts to look primarily to the most equitable and efficient
administration of a debtor's estate in determining what kind of relief should
be granted. If a court can encourage this equitable administration it will do
so, unless U.S. creditors can prove the foreign proceedings are inherently
unfair. The fact that a U.S. creditor may not receive as beneficial a treat-
ment as it might have received in the United States is not enough to persuade
a court that inherent prejudices exist in the foreign system.
Conclusion
The long-standing protectionist attitudes of United States courts which
evolved at common law are gradually being rejected as evidenced by recent
case law interpreting common law principles of comity as well as the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. This trend toward greater recognition of foreign
proceedings represents a move away from territorial views of international
insolvency toward the more cooperative universality views. The movement
is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, since
this increased recognition of foreign proceedings by U.S. courts should
encourage favorable treatment toward U.S. proceedings by foreign courts.
This increased international cooperation and recognition should foster in-
creased stability in international transactions which, in the long run, will
benefit everyone concerned.
131. Id.
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